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The Second Crusade, 1145-49:
Damascus, Lisbon and the Wendish Campaigns
Abstract:
The Second Crusade (1145-49) is thought to have encompassed near simultaneous Christian attacks 
on Muslim towns and cities in Syria and Iberia and pagan Wend strongholds around the southern 
shore of the Baltic Sea. The motivations underpinning the attacks on Damascus, Lisbon and – taken 
collectively – the Wendish strongholds have come in for particular attention. The doomed decision to 
assault Damascus in 1148 rather than recover Edessa, the capital of the first so-called crusader state,  
was once thought to be ill-conceived. Historians now believe the city was attacked because Damascus 
posed a significant threat to the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem when the Second Crusaders arrived in the 
East.  The  assault  on  Lisbon  and the  Wendish  strongholds  fell  into  a  long-established  pattern  of  
regional,  worldly aggression and expansion;  therefore,  historians tend not  to ascribe any spiritual  
impulses behind the native Christians’ decisions to attack their enemies. Indeed, the siege of Lisbon 
by an allied force of international crusaders and those of the Portuguese ruler, Afonso Henriques, is  
perceived primarily as a politico-strategic episode in the on-going Christian-Muslim conflict in Iberia 
– commonly referred to as the reconquista. The native warrior and commercial elite undoubtedly had 
various temporal reasons for engaging in warfare in Iberia and the Baltic region between 1147 and 
1149,  although  the  article  concludes  with  some  notes  of  caution  before  clinically  construing 
motivation from behaviour in such instances. 
On Christmas Eve 1144, Zangī, the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, seized the Christian-held city 
of Edessa in Mesopotamia.  News of the fall  of the county of Edessa’s capital city and the Latin 
settlers’ ensuing appeals for military help probably reached the West by the spring of 1145. Pope 
Eugenius III subsequently issued the papal bull Quantum praedecessores on 1 December of that year, 
and its reissue (with a few small changes) on 1 March 1146 brought about the official launch of the 
enterprise  now known as  the  Second  Crusade  at  King  Louis  VII  of  France’s  Easter  assembly.1 
Quantum praedecessores marked the formal proclamation and legitimisation of a military campaign 
to defend the Latin Church in Outremer. Ever since Giles Constable published his celebrated thesis on  
the scope of the Second Crusade, however, it has been widely accepted that the endeavour evolved  
into a general Christian offensive against a number of the Church’s enemies.2 Thus, the siege of the 
Syrian Muslim city of Damascus in 1148 and the expeditions of the same year directed against the  
Baltic strongholds of Dobin, Demmin and Szczecin situated in the pagan Slav lands east of the River 
Elbe are believed to have formed part of the Second Crusade. The supposed scope of the venture was 
even greater than this:  the Christian attacks on the Muslim-held Iberian cities and strongholds of  
Santarém, Lisbon, Cinta, Almada and Palmela in 1147, Faro, Almería and Tortosa in 1148, and Lérida 
and Fraga in 1149 are all thought to have formed part of the same single enterprise to secure and 
expand the peripheries of Latin Christendom.3 
When combined the various works on the constituent elements of the Second Crusade form a large 
corpus of historiography.4 The motivations underpinning the attacks on Damascus, Lisbon and – taken 
collectively  –  the  Wendish  strongholds  have  come  in  for  particular  attention,5 and  as  will  be 
discussed, a number of themes have emerged. Scholars focus on the decision to attack Damascus 
rather than recover the city of Edessa, the initial casus belli of the Second Crusade. There appears to 
have been little appetite for recovering Edessa, and whilst the subsequent siege of Damascus ended in  
a spectacular failure, historians argue that the decision to attack the city was not as ill-conceived as 
was once presumed. Most of the discussions on the Baltic campaigns are not as narrow in approach, 
and  in  one  significant  way they reflect  much of  the  older  historiography  apropos the  Levantine 
crusades; namely, the campaigns around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea are thought to be the  
product of political and socio-economic motors. In much the same way, historians are reluctant to 
ascribe the Portuguese  ruler,  Afonso Henriques,  with  a  range  of  worldly and religious  concerns;  
certainly,  his decision to assault  Lisbon in 1147 is seen primarily as a matter of politico-strategic 
expediency. As such, some historians question the notion that the attack Lisbon was an integral part of 
the Second Crusade.  
Context  is  the  key to  understanding the Lisbon debate.  A heterogeneous fleet  of  north-European 
warriors set out from the Dart estuary in May 1147 largely in response to Pope Eugenius III’s and  
Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux’s calls to defend the Latin Church in the Levant.6 The fleet stopped en 
route and assisted Afonso Henriques with his siege of Lisbon, which then fell to the allied forces on  
24 October. Constable pointed out that the Christian warriors and their preachers employed crusading 
language,  imagery and themes  in  the  sources  before  and after  the  siege.  He  also  noted  that  the 
crusaders had originally vowed to reach the Holy Sepulchre and that they were signed with the cross 
again before they besieged Lisbon. Thus, he argued, ‘these crusaders regarded their campaign(s) in  
Portugal’ as a stage in ‘the fulfilment of the vow against the enemies if Christendom’, and hence, ‘the 
expedition should…be regarded as part of the broader crusading effort.’7  
Some historians have taken Constable’s contention much further. It has been argued that Bernard of  
Clairvaux preached in support of a proposed attack on Lisbon and that northern European warriors 
had liaised with the Portuguese in this regard before they put in at Oporto; in short, the crusaders’  
involvement in the siege of Lisbon was premeditated.8 Alan Forey has challenged the idea that the 
crusaders planned to support Afonso Henriques before they made landfall in Iberia by questioning the  
veracity of key documents and the notion that Bernard of Clairvaux encouraged the crusaders to assist  
the Portuguese ruler.9 In response, Jonathan Phillips has suggested that Afonso probably made contact 
with the Church authorities and other northern Europeans with whom he was familiar before the fleet  
set sail from Dartmouth. Afonso’s aim was to ensure that the fleet sailed to Lisbon with the hope of 
advancing Christianity and securing the financial rewards that a successful siege might bring.10 The 
two most important sources for the siege of Lisbon,  De expugnatione Lyxbonensi and the so-called 
‘Lisbon Letter’, both demonstrate that the Portuguese ruler knew of the fleet’s existence before it  
reached Lisbon, but this does not prove that the crusaders’ attack on Lisbon was premeditated. And as 
Forey points out, the former source indicates that the negotiations which resulted in the allied attack 
on Lisbon did not commence until the fleet had made landfall in Portugal. He concludes that the fleet  
was  essentially  persuaded  to  assist  Afonso  only  after  reaching  Oporto  (presumably  to  collect  
provisions), and the crusaders had not, therefore, initially intended to assist Afonso Henriques with his  
intended siege.11 Far from seeing the attack on Lisbon as part of a broader crusading effort conducted 
between the years 1147-49, the campaign was ‘obviously just an episode in the continuing conflict 
between Christians and Muslims in the Peninsula.’12
Afonso  Henriques  was  a  demonstrably  pious  man  with  a  strong  crusading  pedigree  and  close  
connections to the Templars.13 He instructed the bishop of Oporto, Peter Pitões, to meet and make 
welcome the crusaders as the fleet reached the town of Oporto, and to convince them by whatever 
means  necessary  to  help  the  Portuguese  ruler  in  the  siege  of  Lisbon.  According  to  the  De 
expugnatione Lyxbonensi, the bishop then made an impassioned address to the crusaders duly aimed 
at securing their assistance in the planned siege. Whilst the anonymous, eyewitness author of the  De 
expugnatione Lyxbonensi may have embroidered some of the words of the set-piece speeches found in 
this source to emphasise how the crusaders at Lisbon acted with right intention and a unity of purpose,  
it  is  not  certain  that  this  was  the  case  with  the  bishop’s  sermon  to  the  northern  crusaders. 14 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty,  Peter’s sermon clearly drew on - amongst  other themes – those 
employed  in  the  preaching  for  the  Levantine  crusade,  including  its  divine  sanction  and  salvific 
character.15 His sermon also aligned with the preaching, and indeed, the papal and clerical support 
afforded the native Iberian Christians who campaigned against their Muslim enemies in 1147-48.16 
This was an immensely devotional milieu; to the bishop of Oporto and presumably the man who 
ordered him to secure the services of the northern Europeans, namely, Afonso Henriques, the siege of 
Lisbon  would  have  been  perceived  as  an  episode  of  spiritually  meritorious  Christian  violence 
congruous to those occurring elsewhere on the peninsula.  
Whilst Afonso may have thought and hoped that his actions at Lisbon would obtain from God an  
eternal reward, there is little doubt that he had a number of temporal reasons for choosing to attack  
Lisbon in 1147: the timing was certainly right, and he was unquestionably an ambitious man. Afonso 
probably saw the arrival of the crusader fleet as an opportunity to exploit the political collapse of the 
previously  dominant  Almoravids  in  al-Andalus  and  the  temporary  disunity  of  the  Taifas,  the 
independent petty Muslim kingdoms created in the wake of the Almoravid collapse. The capitulation 
of Lisbon would also reinforce Afonso’s credentials as a Christian king worthy of papal recognition,  
and further assert his independence from his nominal overlord, the emperor Alfonso VII of León-
Castile. Such was the politico-strategical ambition of the man and owing largely to what may have 
been a fortuitous decision by the crusaders to set down at Oporto en route to the Levant in May 1147, 
many historians consider that Afonso’s decision to besiege Lisbon was in fact devoid of a spiritual 
stimulus.17
Scholars  hold similar  views  apropos the  allied Christian attacks  on the pagan targets  around the 
southern shore of the Baltic Sea, the next strongholds to be attacked by warriors whose actions were 
sanctioned  by ecclesiastical  authorities  in  1147.  While  preaching  in  support  of  the  campaign  to 
Outremer in March 1147, Bernard of Clairvaux attended a major assembly of the German nobility at 
Frankfurt am Main, and here he seems to have verbally sanctioned an extension in the geographical  
scope of the crusade. Saxon nobles declined Bernard’s invitation to campaign in the East, justifying  
their  decision by referring to  the idolatrous activities  of the  neighbouring pagan Wends.  Bernard 
subsequently promised the Frankfurt am Main audience the same spiritual privileges for fighting the 
Wends as those offered to warriors who vowed to campaign in Outremer. Whether it was the Saxon  
nobles or Bernard of Clairvaux who first mooted the extension of spiritual privileges to those wanting 
to fight the Wends is unclear. One way or another, Bernard wholly supported the decisions made by 
the Saxon nobles and a number of them then took the cross a Frankfurt am Main after vowing to 
campaign against their pagan neighbours.18 
Eugenius III reacted quickly to the initiative taken at Frankfurt am Main by issuing a bull on 11 or 13  
April  1147.  Divina  dispensatione  (II)  effectively sanctioned the  campaign to  the  southern  Baltic 
region while mentioning the original expedition planned to liberate the Church in the Latin East, and 
referring to the contemporaneous Christian-Muslim conflict in the Iberian Peninsula.19 Individuals in 
northern Germany, Denmark and Poland promptly responded to Bernard’s and Eugenius’s calls to  
arms and were ready to embark against their pagan neighbours in the summer of 1147. The campaign 
against the Wends had two parts. A combined Saxon army was headed by Duke Henry the Lion and 
supported by the Danish fleets of the rival kings Knud V and Svend III. This force unsuccessfully 
besieged the remote and newly fortified pagan Abodrite outpost at Dobin on Lake Schwerin in July 
1147. Margrave Albert the Bear and the papal legate, Anselm of Havelberg, led a second force; this  
army may have included a Polish contingent headed by the Piast prince, Mieszko III the Old. The 
combined forces set out from Magdeburg in late July and advanced towards the territory of the pagan  
Liutizians. After the capture of Havelberg, the army pushed on to unsuccessfully besiege Liutizian 
Demmin on the River Peene. A contingent led by Albert the Bear continued east to the gates of the 
western Pomeranian trading station of Szczecin. Here Albert discovered that the town was already in  
Christian hands, which effectively put an end to the Wendish campaign.20 
Contemporaries reproached the crusaders for their inability to defeat the pagan Wends, and some of 
the original allegations levelled at them have found their way into the modern historiography. The 
Saxons were seemingly only interested in the receipt of tribute: ‘They did not want to kill the goose 
that laid the eggs, even for the good of their souls’.21 The expedition is thought to have provided the 
Danes with an opportunity to seek revenge against Slav pirates and slavers. For the Poles, it was  
simply a chance to intimidate the ‘Prussians’.22 The traditional historiography has the Saxons, Danes, 
and Poles seemingly united in their pursuit of their non-pious goals. As Christopher Tyerman states,  
‘politics got the better of piety’.23  Jay T. Lees has likewise recently ascribed the attacks on the Wends 
as the product of temporal objectives. However, he disagrees with the notion that a shared endeavour 
stimulated  the  attacks  on  the  pagans.  He  suggests  that  when the  Christian  protagonists  marched 
against the Wends they did so out of fear that a Christian adversary might claim territory east of the  
River Elbe that they themselves had a claim to possess. He concludes with the leaders of the Wendish 
crusade doubting that their campaign was a ‘righteous enterprise’.24 
While Christian forces marched against pagan strongholds around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea 
in 1147, King Conrad III of Germany and King Louis VII of France led separate forces over a classic  
pilgrimage  route  towards  the  Holy  Land  largely  in  response  to  Eugenius  III’s  and  Bernard  of  
Clairvaux’s  call  to  arms.25 After  being  shipped  over  the  Bosphoros,  the  respective  forces  were 
devastated in Anatolia through dehydration, malnutrition, fatigue, disease and Turkish attacks. King 
Louis and many of the French magnates managed to embark on ships at Attaleia on the southern shore 
of  Anatolia,  and  the  king  eventually  arrived  at  Antioch  in  March  1148.  The  prince  of  Antioch,  
Raymond of Poitiers, had courted the French king while he was still in France in anticipation of his  
help in strengthening the prince’s power in northern Syria. Raymond hoped to subjugate a number of 
neighbouring cities including Aleppo, the centre of Zangīd power. The capture of Aleppo would have 
strengthened the Latin presence in the region, and in theory, it would almost certainly have made the 
recapture of Edessa an easier proposition. After spending three months recuperating, however, Louis 
VII declined the prince’s proposals and instead headed south toward the kingdom of Jerusalem. The 
alleged affair between Raymond and his niece, the king’s wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, is often cited as 
a reason for Louis’s refusal to help Antioch.26 Aryeh Graboïs argues that the king had little interest in 
campaigning  in  northern  Syria  or  indeed  in  recovering  Edessa,  since  his  priority  was  the 
accomplishment of his pilgrimage to Jerusalem.27 Whilst Louis was undoubtedly very pious, such an 
interpretation largely discounts the scope of the Capetian’s motivations for going on crusade.28 A 
strand  of  the  historiography  seeks  to  place  Louis’s  decision  within  the  context  of  Byzantium’s 
troubled relationship with the principality of Antioch. Phillips, for example, points out that the prince 
of Antioch was a vassal of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, and that the French crusaders blamed the 
emperor  for  their  various  problems  in  the  empire  and  Anatolia.  Increasing  the  power  of  the 
Antiochene prince in northern Syria would in effect extend Byzantine influence in the Levant, and 
this was something that the king and his advisors would not countenance.29 Louis’s reasoning for 
marching south may have been much more prosaic: the native Christian population of Edessa was 
slaughtered, enslaved or exiled following the failed uprising that attempted to recover the city in 
October 1146.30 Much of the city, including the walls of the citadel, was then razed.31 There was little 
point  in recovering Edessa,  and by extension,  Louis may have felt  there was less need to attack  
Aleppo as an indirect means of regaining the devastated city. 
One must also take the wishes and concerns of King Conrad III of Germany and the Jerusalemite 
nobility into consideration when discussing Louis’s decision to march south. Having recuperated at  
the Byzantine court in Constantinople from his ordeals in Anatolia, Conrad arrived by ship at Acre in 
April 1148. Louis was still in the north at this point recovering from his own troubles in the peninsula.  
The eyewitness, Otto of Freising, indicates that the German king subsequently made an agreement 
with King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem and the Templars to lead an army 
against Damascus in the following July.32 It may be that Conrad was aware of the hopeless situation 
in Edessa and had been convinced that an attack on Damascus was in the best interests of the settlers 
in Outremer. William of Tyre confirms that the Jerusalemite nobility hoped the crusaders would offer 
them military assistance in taking a neighbouring Muslim city. He adds that Patriarch Fulcher was 
sent to Louis VII, who was at that time residing in Tripoli, to convince the king to continue south to  
Jerusalem.33 Perhaps it is not surprising that Louis chose to march south with the weakened French  
army and looked to join forces with Conrad and the Jerusalemite barons, given that they had already 
agreed to attack Damascus. Surely, Louis must have also considered that assisting the kingdom of 
Jerusalem (while taking the opportunity of visiting its holy places) would be of most benefit to Latin 
Christendom, especially given his likely concerns with fighting in northern Syria. 
The decision to attack Damascus in 1148 has come in for a great deal of attention. Zangī had begun to  
threaten the independence of Damascus in 1135 and he laid siege to the city four years later. The 
Damascenes approached the rulers of Jerusalem and offered them a number of incentives to lift the  
siege, which they managed to do: it was hardly in Jerusalem’s interests to have the acquisitive Zangī 
in control of the largest Muslim city in the region. The plan to attack Damascus was thought to be ill-
conceived, particularly as its subsequent failure made an enemy of a city that had been allied with 
Jerusalem since 1140.34 Hoch has since offered a number of reasons why Damascus was chosen as a 
target in 1148. Most contentiously, he argues that there had been a complete realignment in Muslim 
power in Syria in the years immediately preceding the arrival of the Second Crusaders in the Levant, 
the chief and pertinent product of which was an alliance between Damascus and Zangīd Aleppo made 
in the spring of 1147. If Hoch is  correct,  this  agreement essentially rendered obsolete the former 
alliance between Damascus and the kingdom of Jerusalem. And in any case, that alliance was made in  
a  specific  strategic  situation  in  1140,  and  should  not  be  viewed  as  an  unconditional  long-term 
agreement. A Damascene-Aleppan alliance would have posed a significant threat to the security of the  
Latin kingdom.35
The subsequent campaign against Damascus is habitually termed a fiasco with the episode ending 
with an ignominious withdrawal of the allied Christian forces.36 But the actual decision to attack 
Damascus may not have been ill-conceived. The recovery of the city of Edessa, the initial casus belli  
of the Second Crusade, was no longer a viable option. Knights of the Temple,  King Baldwin III of 
Jerusalem and Patriarch Fulcher of Jerusalem appear to have convinced King Conrad III of Germany 
to attack Damascus. Given King Louis VII of France’s likely concerns with campaigning in northern 
Syria, perhaps he and the remaining Jerusalemite nobility were happy to endorse the plan to attack the 
Syrian city. If Hoch is correct, moreover, a Damascene-Aleppan alliance posed a significant menace 
to  the  security of  the  kingdom in  1148;  hence,  the  move  against  Damascus  could  be  seen  as  a 
judicious attempt  to  remove the threat  with an allied force of crusaders  and Latin Jerusalemites,  
notwithstanding the military incompetence or Frankish political  intrigue that may have caused its 
rapid failure.37  
Few modern commentators doubt the spiritual motives of those Christian warriors who arrived in the 
Levant in 1148 and who went on to besiege Damascus. This may be because they are thought not to  
have the same types of geopolitical considerations for originally embarking on crusade as those that 
historians ascribe to the native Christians involved in the Iberian and Baltic campaigns. The native 
Christian  elites  undoubtedly  had  various  temporal  reasons  –  the  attainment  and  maintenance  of 
honour, family tradition, memory and a desire to augment the heroic deeds of forbears, the creation, 
expansion and exploitation of new and existing commercial opportunities and so on – for engaging in  
warfare in Iberia and the Baltic region.38 The Christian offensives undertaken between 1147 and 1149 
on the western and northern peripheries of Christendom fit into a well-established pattern of worldly 
aggression and expansion. Normal temporal aspirations were not suspended during these years. It is  
possible,  even likely,  that  Christian aggression in Iberia and the Baltic area would have occurred 
without papal and clerical support. 
But  there  is  a  danger  in  clinically construing  motivation  from behaviour  in  such  instances.  The 
evidence does not allow a neat separation of religious from worldly matters. The ubiquitous medieval  
concern for the soul was no less important to contemporaries than the desire for land nor the various 
other forms of temporal gain. In fact,  spiritual matters intertwined with temporal  concerns in the  
minds of contemporaries. The mass of evidence suggests that the processes of conquest, subjugation 
and  extraction  were  considered  spiritually  beneficial,  and  God  certainly  rewarded  spiritually 
meritorious acts with earthly gains. 
Moreover,  attempting  to  secure  and  expand  the  peripheries  of  Christendom  and  engaging  in 
penitential warfare was often the same thing. Take the Lisbon campaign: the tumultuous events in the  
Near  East  in  1144  that  gave  rise  to  subsequent  papal  bulls  and  Bernardine  inspired  preaching 
coincided  with  advantageous  geopolitical  circumstances  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula  that  expedited 
Christian territorial expansion. As native, noble warriors, those who fought in Iberia - and indeed in  
the Baltic region - had obvious worldly ambitions and obligations. The warriors in each region had  
also been familiar with the notion of spiritually rewarding warfare since at least the second half of the 
eleventh  century,  and  these  same  warriors  were  instrumental  in  seeking  papal  and/or  clerical  
endorsement  for  their  military actions.  In  other  words,  they endeavoured  to  secure  religious and 
spiritual privileges and support in pursuit of long-held temporal concerns. Consequently, Christian 
forces campaigning around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea were able to ally together to form 
substantial armies while securing papal indulgences for their subsequent actions. In Iberia, Afonso 
Henriques was able to engage his enemy with allied Christian support, which may or may not have  
intended to assist the Portuguese ruler before putting in at Oporto. Acquisitive and in pursuit of long-
held temporal goals most definitely, but the native Christian warriors who fought in Iberia and the 
Baltic region also hoped to obtain God’s mercy in return for their actions. To deny them a religious  
component to their bellicosity as some historians are wont to do risks making light of the spiritual 
anxiety prevalent in the medieval mind where the pains of ‘purgatory’, the horrors of hell and the 
glory of heaven were no less real than the bloody sword in a warrior’s hand.
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